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As many research studies conﬁrm, the importance of collective reputation is increasing, especially in the agro-food chain. Currently, the
reputation of ﬁrms and brands is the main key driver for companies' competitiveness and success in modern markets.
This paper empirically investigates the determinants of reputation of PDO wines in Central Italy. In particular, it uses the qualitative assessment
expressed by the National Association of Sommeliers and proposes a synthetic indicator of reputation. By using different statistical sources, we
also evaluate the impact of some variables on the reputation levels of individual PDO areas. We looked at the structural characteristics of the
designation (number of producers, age of the designation, etc.), the minimum quality standards, and the characteristics of the economic vitality of
the territories. The study aims to contribute to the debate on the role of the quality proposed by ﬁrms and reputation built over time.
& 2015 UniCeSV, University of Florence. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Value proposition is essential to the ﬁrm's competitiveness
and success (Lindgreen and Wynstra, 2005; Porter and
Kramer, 2011). Within the food market, value is traditionally
interpreted in terms of nutritional value or value for money.
However, some marketing research has repeatedly questioned
the consistency of the product attribute to the consumers'
perception of “value” (Gallarza et al., 2011; Sanchez-
Fernandez and Iniesta-Bonillo, 2007).
Studying value is of great interest because it has a direct
bearing on the management of companies and on agro-food10.1016/j.wep.2014.12.003
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nder responsibility of Wine Economics and Policy.policies. In fact, research projects have sought to identify and
manage the drivers of food value over time. All drivers are
interrelated and contribute to the value proposition of the
company – or companies – involved in the system of the
product (supply chains, forms of association, etc.).
Moreover, value is central to food marketing because it
analyse the value perceived by consumers and it ﬁnds systems
to generate and offers value to customers (Albrecht, 1992;
Anderson, 1982; Lindgreen and Wynstra, 2005; Anderson and
Narus, 1999; Woodruff, 1997; Doyle, 2000).
According to Lindgreen et al. (2012), the literature on value is
huge and, despite recent attempts to better understand and
unambiguously deﬁne this concept, academics and practitioners
still disagree on the real meaning of “value” (Anderson and
Narus, 1998).
The literature on value shows that there are currently two,
more or less distinct, research streams, one focusing on the value
of the object of exchange (goods and services), and one focusing
on the value of the process of exchange (the relationships,
networks, and interactions the company is embedded in).lsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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centred (Dagevos and Ophem, 2013) and it incorporates
physical product characteristics, emotional associations evoked
by the food brand, the site or moment of food consumption,
and consumer ethical concerns about certain production
practices in the food system.
This study aims to give value to the food consumption
research by empirically analysing the “collective reputation” of
quality wines. This reputation helped change the intangible
value of wines and is inﬂuenced by many factors: the structure
and behaviour of ﬁrms in the PDO area, their strategy to
enhance quality, the social and economic characteristics of the
territories, etc.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we
introduce the concept of reputation and we elaborate on the
theoretical elements used to develop our hypotheses. Section 4
describes the dataset and gives some descriptive statistics.
Empirical results are discussed in Section 5, and conclusions
are drawn in Section 6.2Wines with a Protected Designation of Origin (PDO wines) in the EU are
wines produced in a delimitated area following speciﬁed production rules
reported in an ofﬁcial document called product speciﬁcation (Reg. 1308/2013)2. Drivers of collective wine reputation
The theoretical debate on reputation is wide ranging, but the
mechanisms used to build reputation have not been fully explored
from an empirical viewpoint (Castriota and Delmastro, 2010).
According to international literature, collective reputation can be
considered a multivariable phenomenon, resulting from the
interaction of complex dynamics deﬁned by managing some
variables in space and in time (Castriota and Delmastro, 2010).
The literature on collective reputation is still in its infancy.
So far, theoretical research has focused on modelling the
collective reputation building process, while the empirical
model has measured the consequences of positive group
reputation on customers' willingness to pay by using the
hedonic price models (e.g. Landon and Smith, 1998). Despite
a number of valuable theoretical works that study the
collective reputation building process, there is still no study
testing group reputation determinants, due to data limitation
(Castriota and Delmastro, 2009).
In their study, Gergaud and Livat (2004) propose an
empirical strategy to assess both umbrella-brand1 impacts
(the impact of collective reputation on a given individual
reputation) and contributions to the umbrella (its contrary).
Empirically, the notion of collective reputation has received
less attention. Erdem (1998) ﬁnds that “consumers of oral-
hygiene products expect the quality levels of umbrella branded
products to be highly correlated”. Sullivan (1990) provides
empirical evidence for the existence of positive and negative
image spillovers between the demand for products sold under
the same brand name in the case of automobiles.
Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) assess the effect of a product
recall on the demand for this product and on the demand for its
substitutes in the case of drugs and cars. The responsible1Umbrella branding is one of the terms used to describe the common
practice of selling several products under the same brand name (Miklós-Thal,
2012).producer bears losses greater than the strict recall costs because
of a loss of goodwill, and those losses spill over to compe-
titors. Due to a negative externality, any favourable effect of a
recall on the demand for substitutes is swamped by a more
general negative effect on the industry. Borenstein and
Zimmerman (1988) examine a similar effect in the case of
airlines. They ﬁnd that a decrease in demand resulting from a
speciﬁc crash affects the airline involved as well as competing
airlines.
Reputation is a basic resource of typical production and an
essential element in value creation process, since a good
reputation allows producers to predict, and expect, future
(positive) incomes (Belletti, 2002). When a ﬁrm has a good
reputation, it attracts customers, which often leads to higher
prices and larger proﬁt margins, while the good reputation of
an individual may result in better careers (see Levin, 2001;
Tadelis, 2002, 2003).
The literature also presents reputation as a mechanism to
provide incentives to agents in order to exert greater efforts
(Mailath and Samuelson, 2002; Tadelis, 2002), if they can reap
the beneﬁts in the future.
Studies have shown that there is “brand confusion” in the
wine sector. Several mistakes are made during the consumer
inference process which unconsciously lead him/her to an
inaccurate assessment of the attributes or beneﬁts of lesser-
known products, since assessments are based on attributes or
performances of the most popular products (Faraoni, 2005).
This can occur even if the consumer links the corporate brand
to the product brand, or vice versa (Foxman et al., 1992).
Therefore, this confusion can give rise to a distortion of the
results of studies performed on various types of wine, one of
the causes being the informational asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970)
affecting the wine sector. On the other hand, the consumer
daily objective is to save time, so he/she takes into account the
brand and territory reputation to verify the quality of the
products to purchase (Andersson, 2002). If properly exploited,
the relationship between the brand and the territory may
provide companies an opportunity to obtain a solid competitive
advantage and it may turn into a distinguishing factor for the
brand as well. Companies may take this into consideration at
different levels and use it in the brand identity building process
(Agrawal and Kamakura, 1999). In a recent study on Italian
consumers' preferences regarding dealcoholised wine informa-
tion and price, Stasi et al. (2014) underline that common
results conﬁrm that origin, vintner, vintage, and brand reputa-
tion signiﬁcantly affect consumers' preferences and their
perception of the product.
A single producer of a PDO2 wine can enjoy reputation
beneﬁts thanks to the consumer past purchases, even if other
ﬁrms of the same PDO produce that wine. Hence, reputationand presented with the name of the producing area (Designation of Origin)
which is protected by law. According to the Italian regulation PDO wines are
presented on the market as wines with Denominazione di Origine Controllata
(DOC wines) or Denominazione di Origine Controllata e Garantita (DOCG
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designation of origin. The history of the production area and
the wine membership to a designation of origin prove to be
synonymous with increased accountability and consumer
protection (Pastore, 2002).
Malorgio et al. (2008) evaluate the efﬁciency of PDO
system in the international wine market as an instrument that
can satisfy the needs of both producers and consumers, and
give advice on how to improve future market performance.
They (2008) show the increasing appreciation of wine con-
sumers in terms of reputation and origin attributes through
descriptive statistics and economic literature review; on the
supply side, they identify the main quality strategies imple-
mented in the international wine market and illustrate the
increasingly important role that origin attributes play on
strategic choices made by ﬁrms worldwide.
The concept of reputation can be better understood in the
imperfect information context (Stiglitz, 1989), as previously
mentioned. According to Andersson (2002), the reputation phe-
nomenon concerns many experience goods or services, whose
quality is difﬁcult to ascertain at reasonable costs before consump-
tion. Andersson shows that the proﬁts generated by a ﬁrm with a
pooled reputation for producing two high quality goods are “not
lower” than the sum of the proﬁts generated by two separate ﬁrms,
each producing a high quality good and having its own individual
reputation. Collective reputation is important because many
markets have a huge variety of products and abundance of
information. Consumers willing to economise on the costs of
ascertaining quality often rely on the reputation of ﬁrms or groups
for their purchases (Andersson, 2002). When forming expectations,
consumers have to choose the sources of information to use and
the level of informational knowledge they are willing to accept
(Costanigro et al., 2009). Gergaud et al., (2012) underline that a
good reputation is often crucial in attracting and retaining
customers, and it can also be associated with a signiﬁcant price
premium. The ﬁrst source of information is usually related to
geographical brands, information on the ﬁrm and bottle/vintage
requiring a higher level of expertise (Castriota and Delmastro,
2009).
While the impact of group reputation on individual reputa-
tion has been analysed, no empirical work has thus far tested
the determinants of the collective reputation building process.
Actually, some papers evaluate the impact of group reputation
on individual reputation and/or prices; in particular, due to the
large availability of data from prestigious wine guides, some
empirical papers deal with (the consequences of) collective
reputation referring to the wine sector. The studies by Landon
and Smith (1998), Schamel and Anderson (2003), Castriota
and Delmastro (2008), and Costanigro et al. (2009) analyse –
among other things – the impact of collective reputation on the
reputations of wineries or on wine prices.(footnote continued)
wine). The latter are PDO wines with a longer tradition and stricter production
rules (D. Leg. 61/2010).3. Research hypotheses
Nevertheless, some studies allow to set some hypotheses on
speciﬁc determinants of reputation in the case of PDO wines
and the current research had the objective to test such
hypotheses.
Tirole (1996) argues that an individual member of the chain
decides on his effort level on the basis of the value of
collective reputation, which is established by former and
existing members of the umbrella brand, before the individual's
entry. In other words, the effort level of an individual member
is likely to be affected by past behaviours of other members in
the umbrella. In a study on wine produced in the Bordeaux
areas, Gergaud and Livat (2004, 2010) supported Tirole's view
and empirically showed that collective reputation is affected by
individual reputation, and vice versa. Speciﬁcally, their model
(2004; 2010) has strong connections with the umbrella
branding literature (see Gergaud et al., 2012 or Miklós-Thal,
2012 for a recent and more detailed survey). This literature
shows that a collective brand or name may be a quality
signal through image spillovers which create reputation
linkages among various ﬁrms or individuals (Choi et al.,
1995). In this context, individual incentives are associated
with group incentives; such a connection provides a strong
commitment to maintain a high level of quality for each
product and could, in turn, serve as a competitive advantage.
Actually, the possibility for consumers to identify a range of
products with the group can provide the ﬁrm substantial
economies of scope.
For these reasons, it is interesting to investigate some
aspects related to the structure of the Designation. The analysis
of the links between these aspects and reputation can lead
to a better understanding of which of the main structural
aspects of a collective brand play a signiﬁcant role in the level
of reputation of a wine. So, the following hypothesis is
formulated.
H1. The structural aspects of Designation have an impact on
wine reputation.
As suggested by Shapiro (1983), reputation means the
expected quality as assessed by peers or consumers. According
to Shapiro (1983), “a ﬁrm has a good reputation if consumers
believe its products are high in quality”. In our study,
collective reputation is a property of the Designation, it is
shared between producers and, despite its expansiveness in
excluding others from use, it can be restored in time (Ostrom,
1996). This mechanism is theorised by Shapiro (1983): in the
case of repeated purchasing, reputation increases when the
attributes deﬁning the quality of a product are not detectable
before purchase.
According to Fleckinger (2007), the reputation building
process requires the establishment of a lasting relationship
between the territory, its producers and potential buyers. The
stable agreement among producers in the promise of certiﬁed
quality allows a stable quality level of the production within
the collective brand and, thus, a well-established level of
reputation. We have therefore identiﬁed a second research
A. Marchini et al. / Wine Economics and Policy 3 (2014) 127–137130hypothesis which relates the level of reputation to the mini-
mum quality standards.
H2. The minimum quality standards have an impact on wine
reputation.
Wernerfelt (1988) demonstrates that brand extension is
efﬁcient only when all products under the umbrella are of
good quality and, therefore, contribute to the reputation of the
umbrella. Brand extension practices (Tauber Edward, 1988)
and, more generally, bundling a product of established quality
with one of unknown quality can also be seen as a mechanism
for informational leverage, where a ﬁrm leverages off a good's
reputation in one market to mitigate the problem of informa-
tional asymmetry encountered in other markets (Choi, 1998,
2003).
When looking at the differentiation strategy of a wine, its
association with a speciﬁc territory and the sharing of meaning
are to be considered too. They actually represent an advantage
for the ﬁrm that exploits this relationship to enhance its
reputation and make the brand more attractive to consumer
(Vescovi and Gazzola, 2007). Hertzberg and Malorgio (2008)
examine consumer preferences for wine attributes through a
choice experiment carried out on 444 wine buyers in North-
Eastern Italy. Results indicate that the presence of PDO, a
known brand and the indication of the grapevine variety on the
label increase the choice probability and they are all associated
with a positive WTP (Willingness To pay). Price has a smaller
inﬂuence than other attributes and its relationship with utility is
quadratic. The private label only slightly affects consumer
choices, with a negative or positive effect depending on the
initial price of the wine.
For these reasons, we also consider the impact of the several
types of differentiation on the reputation level. Hence, we
deﬁne a speciﬁc research hypothesis.
H3. A differentiation has an impact on wine reputation.
Within the wine market, it is important to take into account
the strong interaction between different systems (tourist,
environmental, social, cultural and others), and to consider
them as being strictly related to the wine system in order to
transfer the suitable reputation created by all these factors to
consumers (Lopolito et al., 2010). Several studies focus on
these aspects to deﬁne the dynamics of rural development and
the agro-food market (Belletti, 2001). Other works analyse the
impact of different factors on wine reputation: for example
Gokcekus and Finnegan (2013) examine the relationship
between regional reputation and the price–quality ratio of
wine during the Great Recession (September 2008 until June
2009). Their study (2013) shows that a substantial decline in
income and a rise in information sharing via the internet and
social media had a dampening effect on the regional reputation
premium and lowered the price–quality ratio differences
among different wine regions.
When a local system establishes a local product, it uses
the collective reputation, which seems to play a major role
in deﬁning the ﬁnal notoriety of the product. A product with
a PDO can actually be considered as an institutional andjuridical process to control and preserve collective reputation.
The advantage consists in the possibility for producers to
achieve some beneﬁts – deriving from collective reputation –
in order to obtain better incomes for the entire geographical
region (Sisto et al., 2006). Bureau and Valceschini (2003)
claim that “the appellation of origin has proved successful in
allowing even small producer groups to beneﬁt from a well-
established reputation”. In products, tradition does not merely
coincide with their territorial origin and/or PDO label, but it
also reﬂects real local roots as well as the historical, cultural
and material aspects of the territory (Antonioli Corignano,
1999; Pacciani et al., 2001).
Further, analysing the social and economic environment by
evaluating the quality and quantity of services allows to identify
the communication level of the territory and to determine
whether this can be considered or not a “marginal area”
(Methods and Objectives for and effective use of Community
Founds 2014–2020, 2012). Moreover, the cultural component of
an area is increasingly contributing to the process of economic
value creation (Sacco and Ferilli, 2006).
Speciﬁc (territorial) resources, due to their selective nature
(i.e. they are used only in speciﬁc geographical areas), play an
important role: on the one hand, they increase the competi-
tiveness of local systems, thanks to their ability to improve the
strength of relationship and trade systems; on the other, they
promote the speciﬁc quality of traditional food products
(Belletti, 2002).
For this reason, it is interesting to study contextual factors in
the wine reputation building process.
H4. Contextual factors have an impact on wine reputation.
4. Material and method
The study moves from the (simpliﬁed) assumption that the
reputation of a wine with PDO is closely related to its
structural aspects, minimum quality standards, level of differ-
entiation and contextual factors. These contribute, along with
the reputation of the winery, to the collective reputation of the
whole production area. Therefore, reputation is related to a
vague and subjective perception of quality, often shaped by
“opinion leaders”, who have the power to inﬂuence the general
public on the quality of wines and their production areas.
These aspects are critical also to the success of wine tourism.
The starting point of the analysis is the deﬁnition of
reputation adopted in this study, on the basis of the literature
on model exchange with quality premium (Shapiro, 1983;
Klein and Lefﬂer, 1981). In particular, reputation is interpreted
as accumulation at the time t of the levels of quality offered at
the time tn (past value proposition), and it is perceived by
consumers through the consumption experience and the
knowledge of the area of origin. At the same time, the different
reputation levels represent the promise of quality products for
the future tþ1 (new value proposition) (Stiglitz, 1989; Belletti,
2001).
Several studies have been carried out on wine notoriety by
analysing both the collective and the individual notoriety and
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published by prestigious wine guides as reputation indicators
(Landon and Smith, 1998; Schamel and Anderson, 2003;
Castriota and Delmastro, 2008; Costanigro et al., 2009).
In the past, many studies evaluating the “hedonic prices” of
wines have used the scores assigned by guides as a proxy
variable for objective quality (Schamel, 2006; Costanigro
et al., 2007; Angulo et al., 2000). However, the evaluations
of experts in charge for wine evaluation for the guides cannot
be compared to the results of a real testing jury operating, for
example, applying recognised international standards for blind
quality assessment. Indeed, the evaluations used for guides'
ranking are formulated knowing, the wine brand, the story of
the PDO, the geographical site of production, and previous
years' assessments. For these reasons, this evaluation can be
more realistically assimilated to a judgement of the reputation
than to an evaluation of the objective quality of the
tasted wines.
This study intends to investigate the relationships between
qualitative and context indicators on, and the PDO (DOC or
DOCG) reputation levels of PDO wine belonging to different
areas. Research has been carried out on the PDO in four
regions of Central Italy, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche and Lazio.
These four regions are considered among the most important
ones in terms of tradition and innovation in the wine sector at
the national level. In order to empirically analyse data, we
created, for each PDO, database variables that were considered
relevant in increasing notoriety in 2012. Our ﬁnal database
refers to 100 wine designations.
The ﬁrst stage of the empirical analysis involved the
construction of a synthetic indicator as a proxy variable for
the collective reputation of the PDO wines. To this end, we
used the qualitative assessments of individual wines made by
the Bibenda Guide 2012, where every evaluated wine is
assigned a number of “grapes” expressing the assessed quality.
For each PDO area we calculated the sum of total “grapes”.
This sum variable was then categorised into ﬁve levels, from 0
to 5.3
In order to answer to the hypotheses formulated above, we
choose the explanatory variables that represent them. These
variables are related to several aspects of wine. Some of them
are linked to organoleptic aspects, chemical standards and
production technology explicitly imposed by the product
speciﬁcation (all of this information is available in each DO
Production Speciﬁcation). Other variables describe some
relevant social and economic aspects, mainly obtained from
census of population, industry and agriculture. So, all variables
can be classiﬁed into four main groups.4This is the number of producers considering the admission on the register
of Designation.
5To avoid confusion in the interpretation of the variables, we should clarify
H1. The set of variables representing the ﬁrst hypothesis
describes the characteristics of each PDO: the wine DOC or3In a ﬁrst stage of the analysis we have also considered dependent variables
that take into account the number of awards and the number of producer within
each Designation. However, these did not provide satisfactory results. There-
fore, we continued the analysis considering as dependent variable the
reputation categorised in the ﬁve levels.DOCG membership, the PDO establishment year, and the
number of producers.4
H2. The second set of variables represents the “minimum
quality standards” parameters, describing the maximum pro-
duction and grape yield, the minimum alcoholic content (%),
the minimum total acidity value, and the minimum aging.5
H3. The third set of variables considers the differentiation of
wine. Some of these parameters (vertical differentiation) are
more severely set on a voluntary basis with respect to technical
aspects such as the selection of vineyards (classic and
subzone), the agronomical procedures (passito - raisined wine,
late harvest and vin santo), and the oenological standards
(superior for alcoholic content, and reserve for wine aging).
We also consider other variables – not compulsory for
producers, but allowed by national decrees – in order to create
a horizontal differentiation. We take into account the wine
processing systems and the organoleptic properties of different
wine typologies for the different product speciﬁcations (White,
Rose, Red, Dry, slightly sweet, sweet, Novello, Semi-sparkling
and Sparkling).
H4. We complete the information set by collecting data on
average social and economic indicators for the wine designa-
tion regions examined that capture the context aspects. In
particular, we considered variables linked to the reputation
hypothesis; in other words, variables that explain a “tourist,
economic and consumer ﬂow” in the areas. We considered the
following parameters: total population (up to 2010), area
surfaces, number of ATMs per 1000 inhabitants, number of
authorised hotels and holiday farm houses, number of
museums and archaeological sites. Moreover, to take into
account the “agricultural–rural” propensity of territories, the
following indicators have been reported: degree of urbanisation,
agriculture employment level, population dispersion index (cal-
culated as the percentage ratio of the population living in
scattered houses and settlements on the total resident population),
and female population employed in non-agricultural sectors.
Table 1 shows the variables considered in the analysis.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in
the model.
Therefore, the equation model will be structured as follows:
Reputationi ¼ β0þ β1Structural aspects of Designationi
þ β2Minimum quality standardsi
þ β3Differentationiþ β4Contextiþ εi
where the subscript i refers to the different designations.how they were included in the dataset. Within each PDO's product speciﬁca-
tion, different types of wines can be included; for each of these types of wine,
individual characteristics and different values for the qualitative parameters are
speciﬁed. In order to provide a single representative value for the different
variables on a PDO wine, we adopted the result of the arithmetic mean
calculated on the qualitative parameter values expressed in the product
speciﬁcation.
Table 1
Description of variables.
Source: Our elaboration from different databases, 2013.
Variable Source Description
Reputation
“Bibenda Guide” Reputation Bibenda Guide 2012
Edition
Number of “Grapes” for each Designation
H1: Characteristics of Designation
DOC or DOCG National decrees Type of Designation – DV equal to 1 if the Designation is a DOCG
Age Product speciﬁcation Age of Designation (years)
Producers Code of Designation No. of Designation producers
H2: Minimun Quality Standards
Grapes yield Product speciﬁcation Max. tonnes of grapes per hectare
Grapes/wine Product speciﬁcation Max. conversion ratio of grapes used in wine
Wine alcoholic content Product speciﬁcation Min. wine alcoholic content (%)
Wine total acidity Product speciﬁcation Min. total acidity
Wine aging Product speciﬁcation Min. wine aging
H3: Differentation
Classic Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation is from a historical restricted area within the limits of Designation
Subsite Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that belong to a restricted area of the Designation
Passito Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are strong, mostly sweet, from dried grapes
Late harvest Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are late-harvest
Vin Santo Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are strong and sweet, from “passito” grapes, using
traditional methods
Superiore Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are age and contain 0.5–1% more alcohol
Reserve Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are aged for statutory period, usually in casks or
barrels
White Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are white
Rose Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are rose
Red Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are red
Dry Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are dry
Slightly sweet Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are slightly sweet
Sweet Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are sweet
Novello Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines that are early vintage with carbonic fermentation
Semi-sparkling Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wines with excess pressure, due to CO2 in solution between 1
and 2.5 bar
Sparkling Product speciﬁcation DV equal to 1 if the Designation includes wine with excess pressure, due to CO2 in solution, not less than
3 bar
H4: Context
2010 tot. pop. National Census Number of inhabitants
Surface (square km) National Census Surface of the production area
No. ATMs/1000 inhabitants National Census Ratio between number of ATM machines and 1000 inhabitants
No. hotels National Census Number of hotels
No. holiday farm houses National Census Number of holiday farm houses
No. museums National Census Number of museums
No. archaeological sites National Census Number of archaeological sites
Degree of urbanisation National Census Number of inhabitants per 1000 m2
Level of employment in
agriculture
National Census Number of employees in agriculture
Level of female employment National Census Number of female employees
Index of population
dispersion
National Census Dispersion of the population
DV: Dummy Variable.
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the categorical nature of the dependent variable (Agresti, 1996,
2002). Such a characteristic, indeed, arises problems in the use
of OLS modelling, because its assumptions are violated.
Further, due to the ordinal nature of the outcome variable, anordered logit is preferred to the multinomial logistic regression
(Greene, 2011; Dobson and Barnett, 2008). Given that, the
parameters of the equation can be estimated with an ordered
logit regression model. The statistical analysis is performed
with STATA, version 12.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Source: Our elaboration from database, 2013.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Err. Min. Max.
“Bibenda Guide” Reputation 100 1.28 0.149 0 5
Designation 100 0.11 0.031 0 1
Age 100 21.31 1.272 2 43
Producers 100 193.24 44.450 0 3881
Grapes yield 100 11.02 0.257 1 17
Grapes/wine 100 67.78 0.678 35 73
Wine alcoholic content 100 11.54 0.137 9.5 18
Wine total acidity 100 4.69 0.034 4 5.5
Wine aging 100 8.70 1.186 0 42
Classic 100 0.06 0.024 0 1
Subsite 100 0.20 0.040 0 1
Passito 100 0.15 0.036 0 1
Late harvest 100 0.05 0.022 0 1
Vin Santo 100 0.27 0.045 0 1
Superiore 100 0.25 0.043 0 1
Reserve 100 0.41 0.049 0 1
White 100 0.68 0.047 0 1
Rose 100 0.30 0.046 0 1
Red 100 0.67 0.047 0 1
Dry 100 0.20 0.040 0 1
Slightly sweet 100 0.12 0.033 0 1
Sweet 100 0.12 0.033 0 1
Novello 100 0.20 0.040 0 1
Sparkling 100 0.14 0.035 0 1
Spumante 100 0.22 0.042 0 1
2010 tot. pop. 100 112,617.20 16,018.480 2800 773,987
Surface (square km) 100 707.68 90.080 37.88 4587.69
No. ATMs/1000 inhabitants 100 0.65 0.023 0.20 1.22
No. hotels 100 85.32 16.023 1 1007
No. holiday farm houses 100 78.64 14.833 0 813
No. museums 100 1.24 0.427 0 31
No. archaeological sites 100 0.69 0.213 0 16
Degree of urbanisation 100 1.55 0.054 1 3
Level of employment in agriculture 100 9.21 1.203 1.48 104.35
Level of female employment 100 31.19 0.607 17.41 41.48
Index of population dispersion 100 20.00 1.160 0.26 66.21
6The STATA software computes the ordered logit through the dichotomisa-
tion of the outcome variable and by using a cumulative function. Furthermore,
a simplifying hypothesis is assumed: the effect of explanatory variables is not
dependent on response mode, hence we assume that the coefﬁcient values are
constant (proportional-odds model). Generally, this is a reasonable assumption,
but in our analysis we conﬁrmed it by running the omodel (Wolfe, 1997) and
the brant tests (Long and Freese, 2006).
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Given the high number of explanatory variables and the lack
of prior knowledge on which variables should be included in
the model, a subset of variables was chosen using a model
selection method based on deviance test and comparison of
nested models. This selection allows us to obtain the ﬁnal
model of analysis.
Moreover, we checked for potential multicollinearity. There
are two ways to handle this. One is to test for pairwise
correlation between the variables included in the model: only
one variable has a value larger than 0.5 (i.e., 0.60),
suggesting that there is no strong correlation between the
variables of the analysis. The second way is the evaluation of
the Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF), by estimating the equation
using OLS (Menard, 2002). The highest value obtained is 3.22
(average 1.64), which is lower than the usual threshold value
(Hill and Adkins, 2001). Thus, we can exclude multicollinear-
ity problems in our econometric model.In Table 3 we show the estimated ordered logit model with
STATA 2012,6 considering the variables obtained from model
selection.
Based on the research hypotheses previously established, we
now report the results of the estimate.
H1. The hypothesis is conﬁrmed for all the variables belong-
ing to the set “characteristics of designation”. Two of them
(Age and Producers) have low but signiﬁcant beta values. The
variable Designation shows a signiﬁcant and considerable
impact on wine reputation. All betas are signiﬁcant (at the
5% level) and positive, so the presence of a DOCG and the
Table 3
Results of logit model: βj estimates.
Source: Our elaboration from STATA, 2013.
Hypothesis Variable
Reputation Coeff. Std. Err. z P4 |z| [95% Conf. interval]
H1 Designation 1.721 0.727 2.37 0.018 0.295 3.146
Age 0.050 0.020 2.53 0.011 0.011 0.090
Producers 0.004 0.001 3.57 0.000 0.002 0.006
H2 Grapes_yield 0.132 0.122 1.08 0.279 0.370 0.107
Grapes/wine 0.084 0.051 1.66 0.097 0.015 0.183
Wine_alcoholic_content 1.037 0.339 3.06 0.002 0.373 1.702
H3 Subsite 1.200 0.528 2.27 0.023 0.165 2.235
Passito 1.259 0.556 2.26 0.024 0.168 2.349
H4 No. ATMs/1000 Inhabitants 3.608 1.080 3.34 0.001 1.491 5.726
No. Museums 0.446 0.240 1.86 0.063 0.917 0.025
/cut1 20.141 7.637 5.172 35.109
/cut2 21.066 7.664 6.045 36.087
/cut3 22.710 7.715 7.589 37.831
/cut4 24.320 7.766 9.099 39.542
/cut5 26.637 7.911 11.130 42.143
Log likelihood¼103.33148
Number of obs.¼100
LR χ2 (10)¼88.53
Prob4χ2¼0.0000
Preudo R2¼0.2999
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lead to a propensity to have a better reputation.
H2. In the set of variables representing the “minimum quality
standards”, two show a statistical signiﬁcance. The variable
Grapes/wine has a weak signiﬁcance at the 10% level and a
positive sign. The variable Wine_alcoholic_content has a
signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) and positive beta coefﬁcient, so
its value can be taken into account. The result shows that a one
unit increase in the wine alcoholic content leads to a wine
propensity for a better reputation.
H3. The hypothesis is conﬁrmed by two of the variables
belonging to the set “Vertical differentiation”, in particular
Subsite and Passito. The former has a signiﬁcant (at the 5%
level), positive and considerable beta coefﬁcient: this result
shows how Designations that include wines belonging to a
restricted area of designation have a propensity to get a higher
reputation level than those not belonging. The variable Passito as
well has a signiﬁcant (at the 5% level), positive and considerable
relevance in wine reputation: Designations that include wines
belonging to this vertical differentiation have a propensity to get
a higher reputation level than those not belonging.
H4. The hypothesis related to contextual factors ﬁnds support in
two of its variables, in particular No. ATMs/1000 Inhabitants
and No. Museums. The former shows a positive, signiﬁcant and
considerable beta coefﬁcient: an increase in the ratio between the
number of ATM machines and 1000 inhabitants leads to a winepropensity for better reputation. The variable No. Museums has,
on the contrary, a weak signiﬁcance.
In terms of estimates of the predicted probability, Table 4
shows the results. In the estimate of marginal effects we
consider the success odds of a wine so that its reputation level
is 5 (max. threshold). Given that our database contains both
factor and continuous variables, we decided to estimate the
marginal effects setting the second ones equal to their means.
Therefore we explain the marginal effects between the highest
level of reputation and speciﬁc attributes.
H1. The predicted probability of being in the highest level of
reputation is 7%, if the wine has a DOCG designation;
however, this predicted probability decreases at 3%, if the
designation is DOC. The predicted probability of being in the
highest level of reputation is 4%, if the age of designation is at
its mean value. The predicted probability of being in the
highest level of reputation is 3%, if the value for the number of
producers is at its mean value.
H2. The predicted probability of being in the highest level of
reputation is 5%, if the value of the maximum conversion ratio
of grapes used in wine is at its mean value. The predicted
probability of being in the highest level of reputation is 3%, if
the value of the minimum wine alcoholic content is at its
mean value.
H3. The predicted probability of being in the highest level of
reputation is 6%, if the designation includes wines that belong
to a restricted area of designation; this predicted probability
Table 4
Marginal effects.
Source: Our elaboration from STATA, 2013.
Hypothesis Variable Margin Std. Err. p-Value
H1 Designation
1 - DOCG designation 0.068 0.029 0.020
0 - DOC designation 0.029 0.011 0.015
Age 0.037 0.012 0.004
Producers 0.028 0.013 0.030
H2 Grapes/wine 0.050 0.014 0.000
Wine_alcoholic_content 0.029 0.010 0.005
H3 Subsite
1 - Designation includes wines that belong to a restricted area 0.060 0.021 0.005
0 - Designation includes wines that do not belong to a restricted area 0.036 0.012 0.005
Passito
1 - Designation includes wines that are strong, mostly sweet, from dried grapes 0.061 0.023 0.008
0 - Designation includes wines that are not strong, mostly sweet, from dried grapes 0.036 0.011 0.002
H4 No. ATMs/1000 Inhabitants 0.029 0.009 0.003
No. Museums 0.035 0.011 0.002
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area. The predicted probability of being in the highest level of
reputation is 6%, if the wine is a passito; again, this predicted
probability decreases at 4%, if the wine is not a passito.
H4. The predicted probability of being in the highest level of
reputation is 3%, if the value of the ratio between the number of
ATM machines and 1000 inhabitants is at its mean value. The
predicted probability of being in the highest level of reputation
is 4%, if the number of museums is at its mean value.
6. Conclusions
The present research investigated the factors that determine
the level of collective reputation of DOC brands. However, it
is important to consider the limits of this empirical analysis.
In our analysis, we examined only some of the factors that may
affect the reputation of a wine. A parallel study which takes
into account other interesting variables could certainly lead to a
more comprehensive analysis. Nevertheless, relevant aspects
emerge from the study.
As for hypothesis H1, the study conﬁrms the expected result.
The higher the number of ﬁrms, the higher the investments in
marketing, which increase the collective reputation of the DOC.
Similarly, the older the DOC designation, the greater its
reputation, due to the accumulation effect of investments in
marketing and consumer experiences.
Collective reputation is related to the quality proposed by
the companies in the past (H2) and it represents the promise of
quality for the future. Product differentiation within the DOC
areas (subzones, variants of the product, the presence of sweet
wine, etc.) represents a growth factor for the reputation of the
DOC, which is able to offer a wide range of consumer
experiences (H3).
The analysis of the role of the economic characteristics of
the territory is the most difﬁcult aspect to investigate, andmany of the variables are not signiﬁcant (H4). The only
signiﬁcant variable (ATM/1000 Hab.) potentially expresses the
level of economic vitality of the area, as well as the level of
development of services, which is linked to the level of social
interaction and economic attractiveness of territories. However,
these aspects require further studies and investigations.
The results obtained offer useful ideas for future interven-
tions and political instruments in the regions analysed; the
great number of high quality wines in guides demonstrates that
the wine value chain can be considered the main structure in
the social and economic context. However, the development of
collective reputation is closely related to the system of rules
and quality standards deﬁned by the speciﬁcation. Despite the
great number of criticisms to the system of DOC wines, the
presence of shared and mandatory rules resulted in a collective
value that can support SMEs in building their own individual
reputation.
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